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It is a great honour to be invited by Paolo Tedesco to comment
on John Haldon’s latest book on what the author, quite to the point,
has called the paradox of East Roman survival in the period be-
tween the 640s and the 740s.1 Almost twenty years after his classi-
cal study on the transformation of Byzantine culture in the long
seventh century,2 Haldon has revisited this important period of
Byzantine history seeking to answer a different but equally impor-
tant question, namely how did the Empire manage to overcome
one of the major crises in its long existence, the crisis triggered by
the emergence and expansion of the Islamic Caliphate. My com-
ments will focus on a certain aspect of Haldon’s major undertak-
ing, specifically the author’s treatment of issues of ideology and
identity in the period in question. These issues form the main topic
of two chapters of the book, chapter 2 on “Beliefs, Narratives, and
the Moral Universe” and chapter 3 on “Identities, Divisions, and
Solidarities”, although they pervade other parts as well (e.g. chap-
ters 4, “Elites and Interests”, and 7, “Organization, Cohesion, and
Survival”).
I have to admit that writing a short review-essay on a book
with whose main theses I find myself in agreement has proved
harder than I had initially thought. To avoid producing an en-
1 Haldon, 2016.
2 Haldon, 1990.
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comium in the good old Byzantine manner regarding the impor-
tance of a leading scholar’s contribution to research on this period –
something I imagine no one, and least of all the author of the book,
would like to read – I have decided to attempt an analysis of Hal-
don’s methodology, stressing in particular the theoretical founda-
tions of his approach to Byzantine ideology and identity. I believe
that such an approach can be useful and interesting for two reasons:
First, because both these analytical terms have a highly charged and
much-debated theoretical background; and second, because research
on these issues in the Byzantine Empire has a long tradition of in-
tense dialogue, which has recently been revived.
Certainly, Haldon’s book was not intended to provide another
holistic approach to the dominant ideology or the collective identity
of the historical social formation we call Byzantium, even though
his conclusions clearly bear important implications for the period
preceding and, mainly, following that under scrutiny. His main aim
– one he well accomplishes – was to investigate the societal role of
ideas, beliefs and identifications during a concrete period of exten-
sive change by excavating beneath the surface of a large number of
sources. The critical use of different kinds of sources, both from the
Constantinopolitan centre and from the provincial periphery, and
the ability to distinguish which of those can tell us what about dif-
ferent social strata is what makes Haldon’s study valuable, affording
insight into ideology and identity not only from the top down but
also from the bottom up. The book’s greatest merit from the stand-
point of our topic is that it does not seek to unveil the true core of
Byzantine identity or the essential component of that social order’s
dominant ideology – a problem inherent to many studies that have
attempted a holistic approach to the collective identity or the oper-
ative ideology of the Byzantine order.
Within this framework, the interrelation of the analytical terms
ideology and identity, as suggested in the title of my essay, repre-
sents what I consider to be the study’s point of departure from the
theoretical viewpoint. Instead of trying to reconstruct Byzantine Ro-
manness as an identity in the hard sense, one ostensibly shared by
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all in that pre-modern social order, Haldon’s research focuses on
identifications as social processes dependent upon the different
function of dominant ideas and beliefs concerning the East Roman
order in different geographical, social and political contexts. This ex-
plicitly anti-essentialist and anti-reifying approach to identity is
what determines its dialectical relationship with the dominant ide-
ology of the East Roman social order in the period examined.
The author’s approach is evidently influenced by the Marxist
tradition and serves as a good reminder that that tradition, especially
in its so-called neo-Marxist version, has been the most successful in
bridging the two different strands of thought in the study of ideol-
ogy, namely the epistemological and the sociological. That said, it is
important to stress that Haldon’s analysis of the role of a dominant
ideology in the empire that would not die is not concerned with dis-
tinguishing between false and true or, for that matter, secular (ratio-
nalistic) and religious (non-rationalistic) ideas and beliefs. Scrutiny
of the mystifying aspect of ideology is left aside in favour of a socio-
historical approach that scrutinizes the actual societal function of
ideas irrespective of their fictitious or non-fictitious character.
I believe that it is primarily a sophisticated understanding of the
Gramscian concept of hegemony that provides the theoretical back-
ground for Haldon’s approach to the East Roman order’s dominant
ideology and its societal function, i.e. its potential to evoke various
degrees of identification and consent.3 Constantinopolitan hege-
mony was summarized in the central message that the unity of the
imperial order was determined by the divinely-ordained orthodox
monocracy of the emperor of Constantinople, which had to be pro-
tected against the external and internal enemies threatening it. The
fact that the majority of the Empire’s populations bought into this
message was not so much a reflection of legitimation in the Weberian
sense and ideological homogenization as the basis for political unity;
it involved, rather, hegemony as political leadership protected by
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the armour of coercion, that is, hegemony in a context in which co-
ercion and consent existed in a dialectical relationship.
According to the author, if “the Roman Empire was the only
world and the only polity the inhabitants of the Eastern Empire could
envisage, the constant presence of the imperial administration in the
provinces, embodied in local secular and religious élites and in the
imperial armies, permitted both central government and the church
to reinforce imperial authority and, where necessary, to maintain their
control over the provincial populations” (p. 156). The role of state
structures in reproducing the vision of a hierarchical political order
with Constantinople and its emperor at the top, and in circumscribing
political and cultural identifications at different levels in relation to it,
was one part of the equation. The second part was the role of the ap-
paratuses of “civil society” as the principal means for disseminating
this dominant ideological message and promoting its function con-
cerning a unity of ideological purpose beyond the level of the social
elite. This key issue emerges as the central question that the author
addresses – a difficult task and one that undoubtedly represents the
book’s foremost contribution to the topic under discussion.
Haldon takes into account the transformation of the late Antique
city culture in the period in question, marked by the regression of
education and the organizations of the circus factions in the
provinces, and naturally focuses on the main remaining apparatus
of “civil society”, i.e. the church, in order to seek an answer to the
above-mentioned question. However, what makes Byzantium a pe-
culiar case-study is that the Constantinopolitan Church had become
part of the imperial state apparatuses by this time, as Haldon cor-
rectly emphasizes. This dual function of the church as an apparatus
both of the state and of “civil society” facilitates an approach to a
medieval social formation, such as Byzantium, from the perspective
of the Gramscian concept of the “integral state”, in which “civil so-
ciety” is not considered as juxtaposed to the state, but, rather as a
component of it. The centralized seventh-century imperial state,
though not a bureaucratic state in the modern infrastructural sense,
could be much more effective in ideologically penetrating “civil so-
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ciety” than any other state of its time (at least in the Euro-Mediter-
ranean sphere) thanks to its intertwinement with the Constantinop-
olitan Church.
The balanced Gramscian approach to the tyrannical socio-his-
torical question “coercion or consent” regarding the driving force
behind societal cohesion enables Haldon to suggest the more plau-
sible approach to the evident problems posed by the nature of the
sources as well as by the nature of a medieval social order. For in-
stance, even though the ideological influence of the church was ad-
mittedly more far-reaching than that of any other state apparatus in
this period, the actual extent to which the religious or political ideas
it conveyed pervaded the provincial populations that lived outside
the shrunken urban centres and amounted to 80-90% of the entire
population in the period after the 640s remains an open question.
Apart from the fact that, as the author notes, not every community
had a church or a priest, one must also consider that preaching as
the principal vehicle for conveying such messages was restricted to
a certain number of qualified clergymen; not every priest was al-
lowed to undertake this task. On the other hand, peasants and pas-
toralists who had to make a living could certainly not spend most
of their time in church.
Bearing these problems in mind, close examination of the ideo-
logical content of imperial and canon law, which played an equal
role in providing medieval Eastern Roman society’s deontological
framework, leaves little room for doubt that orthodox Christian
identity had become the principal cultural marker of Byzantine Ro-
manness up to the mid-eighth century as a consequence of the iden-
tification between imperial state and church. The author shows that
this development cannot be properly understood outside the dialec-
tical context of the political and military entanglement between
Byzantium and its new major enemy, the Caliphate. The Christian
Empire of the Ecloga is inconceivable outside the context of the
frontal clash with Islam, which as a new barbarian and infidel
“other” (the two notions being synonymous in this case) co-deter-
mined the renegotiated content of the Byzantine “self”. The full-
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blown identification of Christianity and Empire was, inter alia, a re-
sponse to and a by-product of the major threat posed by an emergent
Islamic empire whose political theology was pervaded by notions
of world domination and religious triumphalism.
While highlighting the conducive role of religious worldviews
in the renegotiation of the political and cultural boundaries of Ro-
manness in this period, the author distances himself from older ap-
proaches to Byzantine identity as a homogenous and rather
apolitical Christian identity. He avoids a reifying approach to reli-
gious culture by carefully considering the role of social stratification
and regional differentiation in conditioning the variation of confor-
mity of religious belief and practice within the imperial boundaries.
Moreover, he distinguishes between the Empire as a political com-
munity and the Christian commonwealth that lay beyond its borders
after the 640s. His approach to religion’s political role within the bor-
ders of imperial authority is the best response to two contrasting but
equally essentializing images of Byzantium, as a Christian common-
wealth or as a secular republic of the people. Within this framework,
if the church was the main apparatus through which the state could
reach down to the provincial masses in ideological terms, the army
was the main state apparatus that defined the boundaries of the
Roman political-territorial community and determined its ability to
maintain a necessary degree of cohesion and prevent political dis-
integration in the periods of relentless Muslim onslaught.
For his analysis of the army’s role, Haldon draws on his own ex-
haustive studies on the extensive rearrangement of Byzantine mili-
tary structures during the so-called dark centuries.4 The billeting of
the eastern forces across Anatolia and their concentration on
local/regional defense has been repeatedly emphasized as a decisive
factor for the successful repulsion of a Muslim expansion into Asia
Minor. By stressing the role of geographical proximity to the capital
and the differentiated presence/performance of imperial forces as
YANNIS STOURAITIS
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an explanation of the different outcomes of the Empire’s effort to de-
fend various provinces against the emerging Caliphate, the author
debunks older, oversimplifying explanations that were keen to at-
tribute the staunch defense in Anatolia – as opposed to the rapid loss
of the eastern provinces – to the loyalty of Chalcedonian popula-
tions, i.e. to a reified common identity. Haldon acknowledges that
internal dissension in the Caliphate played a role in disturbing the
Muslim advance and demonstrates that there was nothing excep-
tionally patriotic in the reported reactions of the Anatolian popula-
tions to the Muslim onslaught. Thus, he pinpoints the role of state
structures, namely the military and the church (secular and religious
elites), in circumscribing ideological commitment and identifications
in Asia Minor. On the other end, against the background of the dis-
integrated older elite structures and an inadequate military presence
in the aftermath of the Persian occupation, questions of doctrinal
difference took on greater political importance and played a role in
the Empire’s reduced potential to defend the eastern provinces
against the new foe.5
By not assigning a causal role to ideology and identity in the Em-
pire’s survival as the determining factors of the successful repulsion
of the Islamic threat, Haldon’s account demonstrates first and fore-
most that a multi-causal approach to the process of survival can pro-
vide valuable insight into how a political and military crisis
enhanced the salience of ideas able to play an operative role and un-
derpin identifications with changing socio-political structures in a
constant dialectical relationship with them. Moreover, his account
demonstrates how inter-group warfare could simultaneously have
a destructive and a constructive impact on the solidarity of the East
Roman political community in this period. On the one hand, the
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Muslim offensive, which occurred shortly after the end of the Per-
sian occupation, dealt the final blow to the weakened imperial state
structures in the East – where the religious-ideological dissension
between the “orthodox” Constantinopolitan center and the Mono-
physite periphery had been nurtured for quite a time – thus creating
a context for political separation and alienation. On the other hand,
the same offensive contributed to a rearrangement of state structures
in Anatolia, which was conducive to the renegotiation of the sub-
stance and practices of identification of Roman populations there.
The shrunken empire that emerged from the crisis in the mid-
eighth century was no longer an agglomeration of cities with the im-
perial city at the top. It was, rather, an agglomeration of large
military commands under the centralized rule of the Constantinop-
olitan emperor. In this new constellation, next to the church, the
army’s role in political affairs became central thanks to its vital con-
tribution to preventing the further loss of territory, but also because
it became one of the chief means of politically re-connecting the im-
perial capital with the provinces. Besides the bishops, the main bear-
ers of imperial authority in the provinces were now the generals of
the regionalized armies of the strategides. From the mid-seventh cen-
tury onward, the integration of soldiers into the local structures and
the localization of recruitment transformed these armies and their
strategoi into the main representatives of provincial interests in the
bilateral relationship between the various regions and the imperial
city-state, but also into bearers of provincial voices in matters of cen-
tral government.
Haldon’s account provides the most sophisticated analysis to
date of the processes of militarization and further centralization of
the East Roman imperial order between the 640s and the 740s as two
central developments related to the contemporary changes in that
order’s collective identity and dominant ideology. Elaborating on
his own and others’ recent researches, which have definitively laid
to rest the older romantic narratives about the Empire’s survival as
the work of a “national” army of thematic peasant-soldiers, the au-
thor demonstrates that the remaining Roman populations’ solidarity
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and identification with the imperial center was not the cause of the
Empire’s survival in the period in question, but rather its outcome.
It was the continuity of an internally transformed state that deter-
mined the continuity of identification practices circumscribed by the
operative ideology of the divinely-ordained orthodox monocracy of
the Roman emperor of Constantinople over a Christian empire
whose Islamic counterpart had come to function as nearly its mirror
image by the mid-eighth century.
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